Tuesday, March 18, 2014 - 8:45am to 9:45am
KEC 1007

Speaker Information

Jinsub Kim
Postdoctoral Associate
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Cornell University


A defining feature of a smart grid is its ability to incorporate advanced data analytics for real time monitoring and control. However, heavy reliance on networking for data collection inevitably exposes a grid to threats of cyber attacks. In this talk, we consider man-in-the-middle attacks on power system topology and state estimation, where an attacker alters certain meter data to mislead the control center with an incorrect network topology or state estimate. First, we present a necessary and sufficient condition under which an undetectable attack exists. When an undetectable attack is feasible, we develop a data-driven attack mechanism that does not require any system parameter information; we show that partial meter observations are sufficient for designing undetectable attacks. Then, in order to protect a grid from potential attacks, we develop countermeasures based on meter data authentication. It is shown that if data from a set of meters satisfying a certain graph-covering property are protected, any attack can be detected.

Speaker Bio

Jinsub Kim received the B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering from Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) in 2007 and the Ph.D. degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from Cornell University in 2014. From 2007 to 2012, his graduate study was partially supported by Samsung Scholarship. He has been a postdoctoral associate at Cornell University since September 2013. His research interest spans smart grid, signal processing, and cyber security. In particular, he is interested in developing signal processing methods and big data analytics for secure and economic grid operations. His recent study analyzed vulnerability of power system state estimation and electricity market to man-in-the-middle attacks.